Peruta v. County of San Diego: An Individual Right to Self-Defense Outside the Home and the Application of Strict Scrutiny to Second Amendment Challenges by Ballard, Kevin
Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 47
Issue 1 Ninth Circuit Survey Article 7
January 2017
Peruta v. County of San Diego: An Individual Right
to Self-Defense Outside the Home and the
Application of Strict Scrutiny to Second
Amendment Challenges
Kevin Ballard
Golden Gate University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Second Amendment Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized editor of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kevin Ballard, Peruta v. County of San Diego: An Individual Right to Self-Defense Outside the Home and the Application of Strict Scrutiny to
Second Amendment Challenges, 47 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 25 (2017).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol47/iss1/7
NOTE
PERUTA V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO:
AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE
OUTSIDE THE HOME AND THE
APPLICATION OF STRICT SCRUTINY TO
SECOND AMENDMENT CHALLENGES
KEVIN BALLARD*
“When the law disarms good guys, bad guys rejoice.”1
INTRODUCTION
On July 20, 2012, James Eagan Holmes walked into the only gun-
free movie theater within 20 minutes of his home, armed with a rifle.2
While excited patrons sat watching the newly released Batman movie,
Holmes was sneaking inside through an emergency backdoor. Once in-
side the dark theater, Holmes opened fire on the moviegoers, killing 12
and wounding 58.3 In another instance, on October 1, 2015, America
suffered another tragic mass shooting. A gunman walked into Umpqua
Community College in Roseburg, Oregon and killed ten students and
injured nine others.4 The gunman entered a classroom, asked students
* Doctorate of Jurisprudence Candidate, 2017.  Veteran of the United States Army.  I would
like to thank my family and friends for their support in writing this Note.  I would also like to thank
Professor Laura Cisneros for her guidance and focusing my attention.  I dedicate this Note to my
son, Nathaniel. I would also like to thank the late Justice Antonin Scalia, who passed away during
the writing of this Note, for his many years of service to our nation. For without his brilliant writing,
this Note would not have been possible.
1 Ted Nugent, AZ QUOTES (Oct. 22, 2016), http://www.azquotes.com/quote/367607.
2 John R. Lott, Opinion, Did Colorado Shooter Single Out Cinemark Theater Because It
Banned Guns?, FOX NEWS (Sept. 10, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/09/10/did-colo
rado-shooter-single-out-cinemark-theater.html.
3 Id.
4 KGW Staff, 10 Dead, 9 Injured in Mass Shooting at Oregon College, KGW PORTLAND
(Oct. 3, 2015), http://www.kgw.com/story/news/crime/2015/10/01/report-15-dead-umpqua-commu-
nity-college-shooting/73154898/.
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their religion, and then executed them.5 Immediately following the Ore-
gon shooting, President Barack Obama demanded gun reform and stricter
gun laws.6 These shootings for the moment appear to have become the
norm with every few passing months another incident strikes at the heart
of America, launching the country into another debate about gun
control.7
Though these mass shootings have been well documented by media
outlets and thus have become the basis for a call on gun reform, the
reality is that situations where an armed citizen stops a gunman rarely
gain national attention. Many Americans do not know that in April 2015,
a driver for rideshare company Uber stopped a gunman who open fired
on a crowd in Chicago.8 The driver had a concealed carry permit and
used his own firearm to protect others after witnessing Everardo Cus-
todio fire into the crowd.9 Had this occurred only a few years earlier,
Chicago’s strict gun laws at the time would have made it less likely for
this Uber driver to have been armed as Chicago had a prohibition on
concealed carry until the law was found unconstitutional in 2012.10 In
March 2015, a gunman open fired inside a Philadelphia barber shop.11
After hearing the shots, a licensed permit holder entered the barber shop
and stopped the gunman by killing him.12 These are but a few examples
of how a licensed concealed permit holder can prevent a major tragedy.
These examples show that a licensed permit holder can prevent a
mass shooting, and yet some states are moving in the opposite direction
by limiting the areas in which a licensed permit holder may carry their
weapon. In California, for instance, the legislature responded by banning
individuals with concealed carry permits from carrying firearms while on
5 Andy Campbell & Daniel Marans, Oregon Shooter Asked About Religion, Another Survivor
Attests, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 3, 2015, updated Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/entry/oregon-shooter-asked-about-religion_us_56103b22e4b0dd85030c4feb.
6 Oliver Darcy, Obama Doesn’t Mince Words in Call for Gun Control After Oregon Shoot-
ing: ‘Prayers Are Not Enough,’ THE BLAZE (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2015/
10/01/obama-doesnt-mince-words-in-call-for-gun-control-after-oregon-shooting-prayers-are-not-
enough/.
7 See Ralph Ellis, Orlando shooting: 49 killed, shooter pledged ISIS allegiance, CNN, (June
13, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/12/us/orlando-nightclub-shooting/.
8 Geoff Ziezulewicz, Uber Driver, Licensed to Carry Gun, Shoots Gunman in Logan Square,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE  (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-uber-
driver-shoots-gunman-met-0420-20150419-story.html?reddit.
9 Id.
10 See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012).
11 David Chang, Gunman Shot, Killed Inside West Philly Barbershop, NBC10 PHILADELPHIA
(Mar. 22, 2015), http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/Man-Shot-in-the-Chest-Inside-West-
Philly-Barbershop-297176271.html.
12 Id.
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college campuses.13 California has chosen to leave their college students
less protected at a time when there has been an increase in campus
shootings.14
California law generally prohibits a person from carrying a firearm,
either openly or concealed.15 While open carry, which is to openly carry
a firearm on one’s person, is banned in California, a person may still
conceal carry if they obtain a license. To carry concealed means to have
the firearm concealed upon the person, generally within a waistband in-
side a specially designed holster. A person wishing to carry a concealed
firearm in California may apply for a license, known as a Concealed
Carry Weapons or “CCW,” in the city or county of their work or home.16
To obtain a CCW, an applicant must meet several requirements; in par-
ticular, an applicant must establish “good cause” for the issuing of the
permit.17
Many counties in California allow “good cause” to be satisfied with
a statement that the applicant wants to carry for self-defense.18 However,
in the County of San Diego, to satisfy the “good cause” requirement, an
applicant is required to show a heightened need for security, setting
themselves apart from the mainstream population.19 One applicant, by
the name of Edward Peruta decided to challenge this “good cause” re-
quirement after he was denied a license. Relying on the United States
Supreme Court’s previous decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller 20
and McDonald v. City of Chicago,21 Peruta filed suit against the County
of San Diego, claiming that the county’s “good cause” requirement vio-
lates the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution.22
Although no standard of heightened scrutiny has been affirmatively
adopted by the Supreme Court, based upon the Supreme Court’s deci-
sions in Heller and McDonald, courts should apply strict scrutiny to le-
13 Alexei Koseff, California Bans Concealed Handguns on College, School Campuses, THE
SACRAMENTO BEE, (Oct. 10, 2015), http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/
article38708496.html.
14 Number of Mass Shootings on the Rise, Most at Schools: FBI Report, NBC NEWS (Sept.
25, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/number-mass-shootings-rise-most-schools-fbi-
report-n211261.
15 See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 25400 (prohibiting concealed carry of a firearm), 25850 (prohib-
iting carry of a loaded firearm), 26350 (prohibiting open carry of a firearm) (West 2016).
16 See Cal. Penal Code §§ 26150, 26155 (West 2016).
17 Cal. Penal Code §§ 26150, 26155 (West 2016).
18 Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1171 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 824
F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016).
19 Id. at 1148.
20 District of Columbia v. Heller, 544 U.S. 570 (2008).
21 McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
22 Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 824 F.3d 919
(9th Cir. 2016).
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gal challenges brought under a Second Amendment claim. Through the
application of strict scrutiny, courts can uphold the constitutional right to
keep and bear arms, while still allowing for common sense regulations
such as preventing felons from possessing a firearm. As such, Peruta v.
County of San Diego can be a vessel for the Supreme Court to establish
strict scrutiny as the appropriate level of heightened scrutiny. The Su-
preme Court can settle a split in authorities and give the courts much
needed guidance as each state continues to use different methods in an
attempt to reduce gun violence.
This Note will begin by examining the majority’s analysis in Heller.
The Heller case, through historical interpretation, analyzed the language
of the Second Amendment and settled a long-held dispute about the
meaning of its actual language. This same historical analysis was also
significant in the Supreme Court’s examination of McDonald, which af-
firmatively applied the Second Amendment to the States. Peruta used
the same methodology as Heller and McDonald. Next, this Note will
argue that, based on the historical analysis in Heller, McDonald, and
Peruta, courts addressing the Second Amendment should apply strict
scrutiny review to the legal challenges of the Second Amendment.
Three factors support the application of strict scrutiny as the appro-
priate level of heightened scrutiny. First, the Second, Third, Fourth and
Seventh Circuits examined laws like the one at issue in Peruta and ar-
rived at different conclusions after applying intermediate scrutiny. These
circuits skipped the basic principle of evaluating whether the right to
bear arms outside the home is protected by the Second Amendment and
failed to conduct a historical analysis as performed in Heller and Mc-
Donald, and thus wrongfully applied intermediate scrutiny to Second
Amendment challenges. Second, the application of anything less than
strict scrutiny allows for judicial balancing, which was expressly rejected
in the Heller case. Third, using strict scrutiny, courts can uphold com-
mon-sense gun laws, such as preventing felons from possessing a fire-
arm. This Note will conclude with an application of strict scrutiny to
Peruta, and show that under such application, San Diego’s policy would
not survive.
I. BACKGROUND
To properly examine the case of Peruta, it is necessary to under-
stand the Supreme Court’s decisions in both District of Columbia v. Hel-
ler23 and McDonald v. City of Chicago,24 and more importantly, the
methodology used by the Court to reach these decisions.
23 District of Columbia v. Heller, 544 U.S. 570 (2008).
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A. THE HELLER DECISION DECLARES THE SECOND AMENDMENT IS AN
INDIVIDUAL RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE
“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be in-
fringed.”25 The meaning of this single phrase has been the subject of
numerous debates and interpretations; however, there are generally two
competing views concerning the Second Amendment. The first interpre-
tation is that the Second Amendment only gives the right to possess and
carry a firearm in connection with militia service.26 The second is that
the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to possess a fire-
arm, unconnected with militia service.27 In Heller, the United States Su-
preme Court settled this long debate by declaring the Second
Amendment is an individual right for self-defense, unconnected with mi-
litia service.28
The facts of the Heller case are simple. The District of Columbia
passed a law stating that a person could only carry a handgun if it was
registered.29 However, the District prohibited registration of handguns,
and the carrying of handguns without a license.30 The District also re-
quired that residents who lawfully owned firearms were to keep their
firearms in their home unloaded and disassembled or equipped with a
trigger lock.31 Dick Heller was a special police officer in D.C. who at-
tempted to register a handgun he wished to keep at home.32 D.C. refused
to issue him a certificate. Heller filed suit in the Federal District Court
for the District of Columbia, seeking to enjoin the City from enforcing
the ban on registration of handguns, prohibition of carrying a firearm
inside of the home, and the trigger lock requirement.33
The District Court dismissed Heller’s claim, finding that precedent
shows a rejection of the right to bear arms to be an individual right but
with the service in a militia.34 The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed the decision, holding that the Second Amend-
24 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
25 U.S. Const. amend. II.
26 Heller, 554 U.S. at 570; A militia is a military force that is made of civilians and is de-
signed to supplement a regular army.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 592.
29 Id. at 574.
30 Id. at 574.
31 Heller, 554 U.S. at 575.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 576.
34 Parker v. District of Columbia, 311 F.Supp.2d 103, 110 (2004), rev’d Parker v. District of
Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 (2007), aff’d District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
5
Ballard: Peruta v. County of San Diego
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2017
30 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
ment protects an individual’s right to possess firearms and the D.C. ban
on handguns and associated requirement that firearms be kept nonfunc-
tional violated the Second Amendment.35 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari in 2007, taking up the first ever examination of the Second
Amendment by the Supreme Court.36
Heller was the first time the Supreme Court conducted an in-depth
review of the Second Amendment.37 The Supreme Court began by
breaking down the language of the Second Amendment into two phrases
that could each be examined under two categories: the operative clause
and the prefatory clause.38 The Court then looked to the history of the
language in the Second Amendment and its development.
1. Operative Clause
Through the examination of the operative clause of the Second
Amendment, the Supreme Court concluded the Second Amendment pro-
vides an individual’s right to possess weapons for self-defense. The Su-
preme Court first examined the phrase “right of the people,”39 which
codifies the Second Amendment as a right of the people. The phrase
“right of the people” is mentioned two other times in the Constitution: in
the First Amendment and a similar phrase in the Ninth Amendment.40
Further, the term “people” is used in six provisions of the Constitution,
referring to all and not simply an unspecified subset.41 This reading cre-
ates a poor reasoning that the Second Amendment applies only to mili-
tias, as militias in colonial times consisted of able bodied males within a
certain age range.42 Thus, a more appropriate reading, based upon this
language, is that the Second Amendment is an individual right and “be-
longs to all Americans.”43
The Court then turned to the phrase “keep and bear arms”44 and
determined that “arms” means weapons.45 Since the Eighteenth Century
the term “arms” means weapons that are not specifically designed for
35 Heller, 554 U.S. at 576.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 635.
38 Heller, 554 U.S. at 579. In deciding how to review the Second Amendment, the Court
reasoned that there must be a link between a stated purpose and a command. By requiring this
logical connection, a prefatory clause may resolve ambiguities in the operative clause.
39 Heller, 554 U.S. at 579.
40 Id.
41 Heller, 554 U.S. at 580.
42 Id.
43 Heller, 554 U.S. at 581.
44 Id.
45 Id.
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military use.46 Therefore, the most natural reading of “keep arms” is to
“have weapons.”47 Just as the term “arms” meant weapons in the Eight-
eenth Century, the term “bear” meant “to carry.”48 The Supreme Court
ultimately adopted a definition for the phrase “bear arms” from a previ-
ous opinion of Justice Ginsburg, who dissented in the Heller decision.
Justice Ginsburg, in a previous analysis of a federal firearm statute,
wrote that the Second Amendment indicated that the term “bear” meant
to “wear, bear, or carry upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket,
for the purpose . . . of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive
action in a case of conflict with another.”49 The majority believed Justice
Ginsburg’s statement logically captured the meaning of “bear arms.”50
The meaning of “bear arms,” adopted by the Court from Justice
Ginsburg, also has historical roots. Nine states’ constitutional provisions
adopted in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries preserved the right
of citizens to bear arms for self-defense.51 The Court reasoned these state
constitutions indicate that to “bear arms” means to carry a weapon
outside the military context.52 There are clear examples in history of
when the phrase was not used in a military context. In 1780, Lord Rich-
mond described in the House of Lords that an order to disarm private
citizens is a violation of the constitutional right of Protestant subjects to
keep and bear arms.53 When taken all together, the Court found the
phrase “to keep and bear arms” guarantees “an individual right to possess
and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”54
The historical context surrounding the phrase “shall not be in-
fringed” points that the Second Amendment was written into the Consti-
tution because of hostility towards disarming of citizens. Prior to the
creation of the English Bill of Rights, Kings Charles II and James II used
disarmament on regional enemies to suppress opponents.55 Protestants
then sought assurance, having codified in the English Bill of Rights that
they may have arms for defense.56 By the time the United States was
founded, the right to bear arms was a fundamental right of English sub-
46 Id.
47 Heller, 554 U.S. at 582.
48 Heller, 554 U.S. at 584.
49 Heller, 554 U.S. at 584 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Muscarello v. United States, 524
U.S. 125, 143 (1998)).
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Heller, 554 U.S. at 585.
53 Id. at 592.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 592-93.
56 Heller, 554 U.S. at 593.
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jects.57 Blackstone — the preeminent authority on English law — cited
the arms right as a fundamental right of Englishmen and described it as
“the natural right of resistance and self-preservation.”58 During colonial
times, George III attempted to do the same as the King and began to
disarm the colonists.59 Both articles from the time, and Blackstone’s
commentaries, show that the right to keep arms was understood in early
American history to be a fundamental right of self-preservation.60
The Court concluded after the historical examination of the opera-
tive clause, that the Second Amendment is meant to be an individual
right to possess weapons for self-defense.61 However, the Second
Amendment is not read to mean citizens can carry arms for any sort of
confrontation.62 The Court then turned to the prefatory clause to examine
if their newly ascertained meaning of the operative clause comported
with the prefatory clause.
2. Prefatory Clause
Through the examination of the operative clause with the prefatory
clause, the Supreme Court rejected the idea that the right to bear arms is
contingent with militia service. The Court began its examination of the
prefatory clause by starting with the phrase “well-regulated militia.”  The
Court dismissed D.C.’s interpretation of the phrase to mean an organized
militia, reasoning that Congress has the sole power to organize militias.63
The Supreme Court also found that “well-regulated” means simply to be
properly disciplined or trained.64 After reviewing the history and inter-
pretation of the language of the Second Amendment, the Supreme Court
found that the prefatory and operative clauses fit “perfectly.”65
3. Historical Examination of the Second Amendment With New
Interpretation
After interpreting the Second Amendment as an individual right, the
Supreme Court concluded that their adopted definition was supported by
history.66 The Court examined the interpretation of the Second Amend-
57 Id.
58 Heller, 554 U.S. at 594.
59 Id.
60 Heller, 554 U.S. at 594-95.
61 Id. at 595.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 596.
64 Id. at 597.
65 Id. at 598.
66 Heller, 554 U.S. at 605.
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ment from its ratification until the end of the Nineteenth Century and
found overwhelming evidence that during that time most commentary
and legislation supported the interpretation that the Second Amendment
is an individual right.67
Following post ratification, commentaries viewed the Second
Amendment as a right similar to the First Amendment and as a right
consistent with the English Bill of Rights.68 Specifically, the Supreme
Court noted that St. George Tucker reasoned that the right of self-defense
is the first law of nature.69 As the country moved closer towards civil
war, antislavery advocates invoked their right to bear arms for self-de-
fense.70 During the “Bleeding Kansas” conflict71 in 1856, advocates of
slavery were attempting to disarm those who wished to see slavery abol-
ished, including one South Carolina Senator openly saying that support-
ers of abolishment should be disarmed.72
Pre-Civil War case law also concluded that the Second Amendment
was an individual right. Many cases that interpreted the Second Amend-
ment universally supported an individual right that was unconnected with
a militia service.73 During the 1800s, the Supreme Court of Michigan,
Georgia Supreme Court, and the Louisiana Supreme Court all interpreted
the Second Amendment as an individual right, unconnected to militia
service.74 Post-Civil War results led the Supreme Court to a similar
conclusion.
Following the Civil War, Congress took steps to preserve the Second
Amendment as an individual right. Southern states that continued to try
to disarm blacks were subject to frequent outcry that such actions in-
fringed upon constitutional rights.75 In 1866, Congress enacted the
Freedmen’s Bureau Act and within Section Fourteen it was held that the
right to bear arms “shall be secured to and enjoyed by all citizens.”76
Similarly in the adoption of the 1871 Civil Rights Act, part of the Act
67 Id.
68 Heller, 554 U.S. at 606-08.
69 Heller, 554 U.S. at 606.
70 Id. at 609.
71 The term “Bleeding Kansas” refers to a conflict between proslavery and free-state settlers
during the settling of Kansas. BLEEDING KANSAS, http://www.history.com/topics/bleeding-kansas
(Oct. 1, 2016). In 1854, the Kansas-Nebraska Act overturned portions of the Missouri Compromise.
Id. The residents of the state were to determine if the state would become a free state or a slave state.
Id. This led to a massive influx of both proslavery and abolitionist seeking to influence the decision.
Id. This ultimately led to intense fighting between the two parties, where small armies would clash
throughout the state, leading to the necessity for federal troops to intervene. Id.
72 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 609 (2008).
73 Id. at 610.
74 Id. at 612-13.
75 Id. at 614.
76 Id. at 615.
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was meant to guarantee the right to “keep and bear arms,” going as far as
to make it a crime for any person to attempt to disarm a citizen.77 The
commentaries on the Constitution following the Civil War also were sim-
ilar. The commentaries spoke of the Second Amendment being an adop-
tion of the English Bill of Rights and that the Second Amendment is not
a right to bear arms as part of a militia. For instance, Thomas Cooley
reasoned that the Second Amendment was not connected to militia ser-
vice but rather to have a population familiar with arms so that a militia
may be formed.78 Instead, the Second Amendment is an individual right
that allows citizens to possess arms so that a militia can be formed if
necessary.79
4. Supreme Court Strikes Down D.C. Ban
After concluding that the Second Amendment is an individual right
for self-defense, the Supreme Court then turned its attention to the D.C.
law to see if the challenged law fell under the protection of the Second
Amendment. The Court noted that the D.C. ban would not be upheld on
any “constitutional muster.”80 In striking down the D.C. law, the major-
ity opinion stated:
We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core pro-
tection has been subjected to a freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ ap-
proach. The very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of
government — even the Third Branch of Government — the power to
decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insist-
ing upon. A constitutional guarantee subject to future judges’ assess-
ments of its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all.
Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were under-
stood to have when the people adopted them, whether or not future
legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that scope too broad.81
The majority closed its opinion by adding that many believe a prohi-
bition on handguns is a solution to rising gun problems.82 “But the en-
shrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy
choices off the table.”83
77 Heller, 554 U.S. at 616.
78 Heller, 554 U.S. at 617.
79 Id. at 617-18 (emphasis added).
80 Id. at 629.
81 Id. at 634-35.
82 Heller, 554 U.S. at 636.
83 Id.
10
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B. MCDONALD INCORPORATES THE SECOND AMENDMENT TO STATES
THROUGH FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Two years after the decision in Heller, the Supreme Court incorpo-
rated the Second Amendment via the Fourteenth Amendment to the
states. Within hours of the Supreme Court’s announcement of a ruling in
Heller, residents of Chicago, including Otis McDonald, filed suit against
the City.84 A Chicago city ordinance prevented a person from possessing
a firearm unless they had a valid registration and simultaneously pre-
vented registration for practically all handguns.85 Because the decision in
Heller decided that the Second Amendment was an individual right for
self-defense, the City argued to uphold the law on the grounds the Sec-
ond Amendment does not apply to the states.86 The Supreme Court re-
jected this argument.87
1. Supreme Court’s Historical Analysis Finds Second Amendment is
a Fundamental Right Rooted in Our History
The Fourteenth Amendment states in part that “nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law. . .”88 The Supreme Court, since the passing of the Fourteenth
Amendment, has engaged in “selective incorporation” of the Bill of
Rights through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.89
Currently, only a few constitutional rights remain unincorporated from
the first eight amendments.90 In order to incorporate a right, the Supreme
Court must decide whether the right is fundamental to our scheme of
ordered liberty or in other words, whether the right has deep roots in
America’s history and traditions.91
In McDonald, the Supreme Court expanded its historical analysis
from Heller. The Court started with the foundation that “Heller makes it
clear that this right is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition.’”92
84 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010).
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
89 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 763.
90 The Third Amendment (quartering of soldiers); the Fifth Amendment’s grand jury indict-
ment requirement; the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases; and the Eighth Amend-
ment prohibition on excessive fines are the only remaining provisions from the first eight
amendments that has not been incorporated.
91 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767.
92 Id. at 768 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
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During the founding of our country, both Anti-federalists and Feder-
alists believed the right to bear arms was important.93 Going as far back
as ratification, the fear that a federal government would disarm its citi-
zens in an effort to impose rule through the army or select militias was
pushed by Anti-federalism.94 Federalists argued that the right to bear
arms was adequately protected from the federal government by the limi-
tations placed on the federal government.95 However, evident in this is
that both the Anti-federalists and Federalists agreed that the right to bear
arms was “fundamental to the newly formed system of government.”96
By 1850, the belief that the federal government would disarm the public
was fading as the country turned towards another pivotal time in our
history: The Civil War.97
The Supreme Court found following the end of the Civil War, as
blacks returned to the States of the Confederacy, there were systematic
efforts to disarm them.98 States began passing laws that prohibited black
people from possessing firearms.99 Along with legislative actions in-
tended to disarm black people, throughout the South, armed individuals
were forcibly taking firearms from freed slaves and murdering returning
blacks.100 In South Carolina, prominent black citizens drafted a plea to
Congress in which they urged the protection of constitutional rights, in-
cluding the right to bear arms, and that South Carolina’s legislative ac-
tions be deemed unconstitutional.101
It was evident by the events in the South that legislative action was
needed.102 The 39th Congress passed the Freedmen’s Bureau Act of
1866, which guaranteed the right to bear arms.103 The Freedmen’s bill
was specifically amended to include the right to bear arms.104 The Civil
Rights Act of 1866, like the Freedman’s Bureau Act, aimed to protect the
right to bear arms and those rights enjoyed by white citizens.105 These
acts were later deemed  insufficient and Congress’s adoption of the Four-
93 Anti-federalist supporters opposed the creation of a strong federal government and opposed
the Constitution. Federalist were supporters of the adoption of a Constitution.
94 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 768.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 769.
97 Id. at 770.
98 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 771.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 772.
101 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 771 n.18 (2010).
102 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 773.
103 Id.
104 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 773 n.22.
105 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 774.
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teenth Amendment was understood to protect those rights set out in the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.106
In debating the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, multiple
members of Congress specifically mentioned the right to bear arms as a
key component for its adoption.107 Senator Samuel Pomeroy described
the right to bear arms as one of the indispensable safeguards of liberty.108
Other members of Congress also discussed the importance of the right to
keep and bear arms as a right necessary to our form of government.109
Immediately following the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, Rep-
resentative Stevens said “[d]isarm a community and you rob them of the
means of defending life . . . the fourteenth amendment, now so happily
adopted, settles the whole question.”110
The Court also examined the history of the right to keep and bear
arms as applied to state constitutions. Prior to ratification, four states had
adopted language similar to the Second Amendment as part of their state
constitutions.111 Following ratification, nine additional states adopted
constitutional provisions guaranteeing the right to keep and bear arms for
its citizens.112 In 1868, following the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 22 of 37 states had constitutional provisions protecting the right to
keep and bear arms.113 The Court found that many of these state provi-
sions protected the right to keep and bear arms as an individual right for
self-defense, consistent with the language in Heller.114
The Court concluded its historical analysis by finding “it is clear that
the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right
to keep and bear arms among those fundamental rights necessary to our
system of ordered liberty.”115
2. Chicago’s Ban Violates the Second Amendment
The City of Chicago pleaded with the Supreme Court to treat the
Second Amendment differently than other fundamental rights. The re-
spondents argued that the “Second Amendment should be singled out for
special — and especially unfavorable — treatment.”116 Chicago’s princi-
106 Id. at 775.
107 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 775.
108 Id.
109 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 776 n.25.
110 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 776.
111 Id. at 769.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 777.
114 Id.
115 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 778.
116 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 778-79.
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pal argument was that if any civilized legal system does not recognize
the right to bear arms, then the states are not bound.117 This argument
was rejected by the Court, noting that many of our rights are unique to
the United States.118 For instance, the right to a jury trial is broader than
the right afforded by other countries and the exclusionary rule is distinct
to America only.119
The City of Chicago also wanted to single out the Second Amend-
ment because it concerns the ability to possess a weapon and there is
disagreement over whether handgun possession increases safety.120 The
Second Amendment is not the only controversial constitutional amend-
ment that deals with public safety. The Court reasoned that all the
amendments that place restrictions on law enforcement have similar pub-
lic safety implications.121 For instance, the Fourth Amendment’s exclu-
sionary rule alone leads to extensive and costly litigation.122 The Court
noted that in Heller it rejected the argument that the Second Amendment
should be subject to judicial interest balancing, considering the impor-
tance of the amendment.123
The McDonald court held that the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment incorporates the right recognized in Heller.124 The
possession of firearms is essential for self-defense, which is the central
component of the Second Amendment.125 “In Heller, [the Court] ruled
that the Second Amendment protects the right to possess a handgun in
the home for self-defense.”126 In doing so, the Supreme Court struck
down Chicago’s ban on handguns in the home.
117 Id. at 781 (“. . . municipal respondents continue, because such countries as England, Ca-
nada, Australia, Japan, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg and New Zealand either ban or severely
limit handgun ownership, it must follow that no right to possess such weapons is protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.”).
118 Id.
119 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 778 n.28.
120 Id. at 782-83.
121 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (application of the exclusionary rule may
otherwise set a guilty person free.); see also, Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1996) (violation of
speedy trial right may cause a guilty person to go free.).
122 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 785.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 791.
125 Id. at 787.
126 Id. at 791.
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C. FOLLOWING HELLER AND MCDONALD, FEDERAL APPELLATE
COURTS HAVE CONSISTENTLY NOT CONDUCTED HISTORICAL
ANALYSIS TO SEE IF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
EXTENDS OUTSIDE THE HOME.
Since 2010, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller and
McDonald, citizens began challenging state laws that prevented a person
from possessing a firearm in public, claiming such laws violate the Sec-
ond Amendment. Prior to Peruta, four Circuit Courts of Appeal rendered
opinions as to whether the Second Amendment applies outside of the
home.
The Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits upheld state laws that pre-
vented a person from possessing a firearm in public. Declining to con-
duct a historical analysis as guided by Heller and McDonald, these
circuits chose to narrowly read Heller as applying only to possession of a
firearm inside the home, and therefore applied intermediate scrutiny to
the challenged laws.  In doing so, the circuits skipped the basic principle
of a heightened scrutiny analysis when deciding whether the right
claimed is within the protection of the Second Amendment. To deter-
mine whether a specific right claimed is protected by the Constitution, a
reviewing court will perform a historical analysis to decide whether the
right is rooted in our country’s history and traditions. The Second, Third,
and Fourth Circuits skipped this step.
Although the Seventh Circuit reached the appropriate conclusion, its
methodology was flawed. The Seventh Circuit failed to conduct a histori-
cal analysis, instead relying on Heller and McDonald’s historical analy-
sis. However, Heller and McDonald never addressed the Second
Amendment outside of the home. Heller ultimately decided the Second
Amendment was an individual right and McDonald extended this right to
the states, and at the same time clarified that the central component of the
Second Amendment is self-defense. It was not until Peruta that a court
utilized the appropriate method to determine whether the right to carry a
firearm outside of the home is protected by the Second Amendment. In
doing so, Peruta properly concluded that the right to possess a firearm
outside of the home is protected.
Both the challenge in Heller and McDonald dealt with bans on the
possession of handguns in the home. In Heller, the Supreme Court found
that handguns are the preferred weapon “to ‘keep’ and use for protection
of one’s home and family.”127 The Supreme Court however, has never
127 Heller, 554 U.S. at 629.
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addressed whether the Second Amendment extends outside of the home
or what restrictions are lawful by the State.
D. PERUTA THREE-JUDGE PANEL EXTENDS THE SECOND AMENDMENT
OUTSIDE OF THE HOME
Peruta v. San Diego began when Edward Peruta sought a CCW
from San Diego County.128 Peruta wanted to carry a handgun for self-
defense but when he applied for a CCW, the County of San Diego denied
him because he could not establish “good cause.”129 San Diego County’s
policy required that in order to show “good cause” the applicant must
demonstrate “a set of circumstances that distinguish [the applicant] from
the mainstream and cause[s] him [or her] . . . to be placed in harm’s
way.”130 In 2009, Peruta sued San Diego County under 42 U.S.C. section
1983, seeking injunctive relief to prevent the county from enforcing its
“good cause” requirement.131
The district court granted the County of San Diego’s motion for
summary judgment, reasoning that California’s substantial interest in
public safety by wanting to reduce the number of concealed handguns
“‘trumped the applicants’ allegedly burdened Second Amendment inter-
est.”132 Peruta appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. The Ninth Circuit, guided by the Heller and McDonald decisions,
began by applying a two-step methodology. First, the Court looked to
whether the ability to carry a gun outside of the home for self-defense
falls within the Second Amendment, and second, if the right is protected
by the Second Amendment, does San Diego County’s “good cause” re-
quirement infringe that right.
1. The Right to Carry a Firearm Outside the Home Falls Within the
Second Amendment
The Ninth Circuit three judge panel, like Heller and McDonald, be-
gan its interpretation by looking to the historical interpretation of the
Second Amendment as it relates to carrying a weapon outside the home
for self-defense. The Court began with a historical analysis because “the
128 Peruta, 758 F.Supp.2d at 1106.
129 Id. at 1148.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 824
F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016).
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Second Amendment is a matter not merely of abstract dictionary defini-
tions but also a historical practice.”133
The Court began its historical analysis by examining those cases that
have interpreted the Second Amendment and placed the cases into three
categories. These categories were: (1) authorities that understand bearing
arms for self-defense to be an individual right, consistent with Heller; (2)
authorities that understand bearing arms is an individual right, other than
for self-defense; and (3) authorities that said bearing arms was not an
individual right.134 Naturally, the decisions in the third category were no
help to the court as their premise conflicted with the Supreme Court’s
holding in Heller.
The Court first examined those cases relied on by the Supreme Court
in Heller. In Bliss v. Commonwealth, Kentucky’s highest court inter-
preted Kentucky’s version of the Second Amendment and invalidated a
ban on concealed weapons.135 In Bliss, the high court of Kentucky dis-
agreed that a ban on wearing concealed weapons was merely a regulatory
measure noting that it was not essential for an entire prohibition against
bearing arms in every form and the right to bear arms for self-defense
was secured by the Constitution, meaning an act did not need to be a
complete destruction of the right to be forbidden by the Constitution.136
The Tennessee Supreme Court ruled in 1840 that the right to bear
arms extends outside of the home. In Aymette v. State, the Tennessee
Supreme Court reasoned that if a person were unable to bear arms
openly, then they would be unable to bear arms in defense.137 The Ala-
bama Supreme Court that same year held that a right to bear arms meant
that citizens of Alabama must be permitted to carry a weapon in
public.138
The Peruta court, continuing forth in its historical analysis, noted
that the highest courts of Georgia, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas all in
some manner ruled the Second Amendment extends outside of the
home.139 The Peruta court found that following the Civil War, many
legal commentators, including Thomas Cooley, John Pomeroy, Oliver
133 Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1151.
134 Id. at 1156.
135 Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822).
136 Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1156; Bliss, 12 Ky. at 91-2.
137 Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 151 (1840).
138 State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612 (1840).
139 Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1163-1166. see, e.g., Stockdale v. State, 32 Ga. 225 (1861) (holding
that to prohibit open and concealed carry of pistols would prohibit the right to bear arms altogether).
See also, Cockrum v. State, 24 Tex. 394, (1859) (holding that the right to bear arms in self-defense
is an absolute right and that a legislature affixing a deterrent to the exercise of that right would be
tantamount to a prohibition of the right.).
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Wendell Holmes Jr., and John Ordronaux, wrote in some form that the
Second Amendment was a right that extended outside of the home.140
The Peruta court then turned its attention to other circuits that have
also interpreted the Second Amendment following Heller, and all in
some form have concluded or acknowledged the Second Amendment ex-
tends outside of the home.141 Viewing both the previous authorities and
commentaries, the Ninth Circuit Court concluded that “the carrying of an
operable handgun outside the home for the lawful purpose of self-de-
fense, though subject to traditional restrictions, constitutes bearing arms
within the meaning of the Second Amendment.”142 The Court then
turned its attention toward San Diego County’s regulation.
2. San Diego County’s Regulatory Scheme Infringes on the Second
Amendment
In assessing whether the “good cause” requirement by San Diego
County infringed on the Second Amendment, the Peruta court noted that
there has been great dispute on which level of scrutiny or what approach
is used to measure whether the right is being infringed.143 The one thing
the Court expressed certainty about was that rational basis review did not
apply, citing a footnote from Heller in which Justice Scalia wrote that
rational basis could not be used to evaluate a specific enumerated right,
“be it the freedom of speech, the guarantee against double jeopardy, the
right to counsel, or the right to keep and bear arms.”144
The Court acknowledged that some circuit courts have applied inter-
mediate scrutiny while others have applied some form of heightened
scrutiny.145 However, the Court recognized that there is an alternative
approach to applying heightened scrutiny, as the Supreme Court demon-
140 Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1163-66.
141 Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 4314 (3d Cir. 2013) (“we . . . recognize that the Second
Amendment’s individual right to bear arms may have some application beyond the home.”); Wool-
lard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013) (“we merely assume that the Heller right exists
outside the home. . .); Kachalsky v. County. Of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2012) (analy-
sis proceeded on the assumption Second Amendment has some application to public possession of
firearms.), Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 2012) (“A right to bear arms thus implies
a right to carry a loaded gun outside the home.”).
142 Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1166 (omitting internal quotes).
143 Id. at 1168; noting that some circuits have applied intermediate scrutiny while others have
applied a sliding scale approach, and “Heller and McDonald leave little doubt that courts are to
assess gun bans and regulations based on text, history, and tradition, not by a balancing test such as
strict or intermediate scrutiny.”) (quoting Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kava-
naugh, J., dissenting).
144 Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1168 n.14 (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628
fn.27 (2008)).
145 Id. at 1167-68.
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strated in Heller. If the court finds that the law is a destruction of the
right, rather than a mere burden on it, then no form of heightened scru-
tiny would apply.146 Therefore, the Peruta court began by first determin-
ing whether San Diego County’s policy burdens or destroys the right.147
In California, open carrying of a firearm is prohibited, leaving only
concealed carry as the manner for a person to exercise their right.148 Due
to San Diego County’s policy, the ability to conceal carry has been effec-
tively “taken off the table” because a typical citizen is unable to differen-
tiate themselves from the mainstream, as required by the policy.149  Since
the Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear
arms in public, San Diego’s policy allows only a small group of people
to exercise their right, while the remaining law-abiding citizens are left
with no way to exercise their right outside of the home.150
The Court reasoned by analogy that if San Diego County’s policy
was applied to the First Amendment, it would leave the protection to
only a small pocket of people, and in doing so, it would be a destruction
of the right to free speech as a whole.151 The Second Amendment is no
different from the First Amendment in that a right limited to a few peo-
ple is a destruction of that right.152 As such, San Diego County’s policy
was a burden on the Second Amendment outside of the home, as was the
Washington D.C. law struck down in Heller.153
The Peruta court struck down San Diego’s argument that both the
Heller Court and other 19th century cases that upheld bans on concealed
carry show that San Diego County’s policy is lawful. The Peruta court
pointed out two flaws in the respondent’s argument. The first flaw was
that Peruta’s challenge was not simply because he wanted to conceal
carry, but that concealed carry is the only method available to Peruta
since California does not permit open carry.154 Peruta’s challenge is not
an attack on California’s regulatory scheme, but that of San Diego
County’s, which is out of line with many of the other counties within the
State of California.155
The second flaw of San Diego County’s argument was a narrow
reading of Heller’s acknowledgement on concealed carry restrictions.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1169.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 1170.
152 Id. (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008)).
153 Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1170.
154 Id. at 1170-71.
155 Id. at 1171.
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Most cases relied upon in the Heller decision state that while concealed
carry bans are valid, they are valid so long as they do not destroy the
right to bear arms in public.156 The Court noted that based on these au-
thorities, states are not required to allow for concealed carry, “[b]ut the
Second Amendment does require that the states permit some form of
carry for self-defense outside the home.”157
The court reiterated that regulation of the Second Amendment is
quite appropriate.158 However, San Diego County’s policy and its effec-
tive prohibition on concealed carry amounts to the same destruction of
the right outside the home as the D.C. handgun ban amounted to a de-
struction of the Second Amendment inside of the home.159 San Diego
County’s policy amounts to a near-total prohibition of carrying a firearm
in public, either concealed or openly.160 The court reasoned similar to
Alabama in State v. Reid that, “[a] statute which, under the pretence [sic]
of regulating, amounts to a destruction of the right, or which requires
arms to be so borne as to render them wholly useless for the purpose of
defence [sic], would be clearly unconstitutional.”161 The Court con-
cluded that San Diego County’s policy regarding “good cause” infringed
on the Second Amendment right to bear arms for self-defense.162
D. EN BANC COURT REVERSES THREE JUDGE-PANEL DECISION
THROUGH “STRAW ARGUMENT”
Immediately following the Ninth Circuit Court’s three-panel deci-
sion, San Diego County Sheriff Bill Gore publicly announced that he
would not seek a rehearing of the Peruta decision.163 Sheriff Gore chose
not to seek a rehearing of Peruta en banc because the three-panel deci-
sion provided “clear guidance” on California’s CCW law.164
On February 27, 2014, California’s Attorney General, Kamala Har-
ris, filed a motion to intervene for seeking en banc review,165 claiming
that California should be permitted to intervene because the three-panel
156 Id.
157 Id. at 1172.
158 Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1178.
159 Id. at 1170.
160 Id.
161 Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1170 (quoting State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612 (1840)).
162 Id. at 1179.
163 Bob Egelko, San Diego Sheriff Won’t Fight Concealed-Weapon Ruling, SFGATE, (Feb.
21, 2014, 11:37 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/San-Diego-sheriff-won-t-fight-concealed-
weapon-5257815.php.
164 Id.
165 State of California’s Motion to Intervene at 5, Peruta v. County of San Diego 824 F.3d
919 (9th Cir. 2016) (No. 10-56971), http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2014/02/28/10-
56971_motion_to_intervene.pdf.
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decision calls into question a California statute.166 On March 26, 2015,
the Ninth Circuit Court, upon a majority vote, ordered Peruta to be heard
en banc.167 The Court then heard Peruta en banc on June 16, 2015.168
In Peruta, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016)(“en banc”) the majority of
the en banc panel held that the “Second Amendment does not preserve or
protect a right of a member of the general public to carry concealed fire-
arms in public.”169 The majority reached such a conclusion after con-
ducting a similar historical analysis as in Heller and McDonald, finding
that a historical analysis reveals that the right to carry “a concealed fire-
arm in public is not, and never has been, protected by the Second
Amendment.”170 In a concurring opinion, Judge Graber wrote that the
San Diego County policy, even assuming the Second Amendment ap-
plied outside the home, would still survive under the application of inter-
mediate scrutiny.171 However, the dissenting justices in joining with
Judge Callahan’s dissent, noted that the majority “sets up and knocks
down an elaborate straw argument by answering only a narrow ques-
tion—whether the Second Amendment protects a right to carry con-
cealed firearms in public.”172
As Judge Callahan noted, the cases cited by the majority either pre-
sumed a right to open carry or relied on an interpretation of the Second
Amendment pre-Heller, that the Second Amendment is an individual
right.173 Judge Callahan’s dissent focused on the way the majority has
framed the question it then answers, and in doing so, ignored California’s
regulatory scheme regarding the carrying of firearms outside of the
home. Judge Callahan observed that the majority, instead of interpreting
the California scheme with a broad view towards constitutional rights,
chose to narrowly define the asserted right by the plaintiff as a right to
concealed carry, while ignoring that this is the only form in which a
person may carry in California.174 It is important to note, however, that
rather than invalidate San Diego’s policy, the majority claims “if there is
such a right, it is only a right to carry a firearm openly.”175
166 Id.
167 En Banc Order, Peruta v. County of San Diego 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016) (No. 10-
56971), http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2015/03/26/10-56971%20EB%20Order.pdf.
168 Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
169 Peruta, 824 F.3d at 924.
170 Id. at 929 (“[W]e engage in the same historical inquiry as Heller and McDonald.”).
171 Peruta, 824 F.3d at 942 (Graber, S., concurrence).
172 Id. at 946 (Callahan, M., dissenting).
173 Id.
174 Id. at 954 (Callahan, M., dissenting).
175 Peruta, 824 F.3d at 942.
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II. ARGUMENT
When a petitioner challenges a law as infringing on a constitutional
right, one of the very first steps the court must undertake is to determine
if the right claimed is a fundamental right. A fundamental right is gener-
ally considered to be a right that is founded in our history and traditions,
identified in the Constitution, and that requires a high degree of protec-
tion from the government.176 Put another way, a fundamental right is
“rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental.”177 When a court determines a right to be fundamental, it
triggers the analysis of strict scrutiny.178 However, the circuit courts have
applied a lesser standard of intermediate scrutiny to challenges based on
the Second Amendment.
A. COURTS ARE APPLYING INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY AFTER FAILING
TO DETERMINE IF THE SECOND AMENDMENT NECESSARILY
EXTENDS OUTSIDE OF THE HOME
Currently five circuit courts, including the Ninth Circuit Court, have
addressed the issue of concealed carry outside of the home.179 As noted
in Peruta, the circuit courts have all struggled with which level of scru-
tiny should be applied to the court’s analysis. The Second, Third, and
Fourth Circuits have all applied a version less than strict scrutiny.
1. The Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits Failed to Conduct a
Proper Historical Analysis, Leading to the Application of
Intermediate Scrutiny
In Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, plaintiffs challenged New
York’s requirement of “proper cause” to obtain a concealed carry per-
mit.180 The Second Circuit court in Kachalsky chose to not perform a
historical analysis of the Second Amendment as it relates to bearing arms
in public, believing “history and tradition do not speak with one voice
here.”181 After refusing to conduct a historical analysis, the court decided
176 Legal Information Institute, Fundamental Right, CORNELL UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fundamental_right.
177 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
178 Legal Information Institute, Fundamental Right, CORNELL UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fundamental_right.
179 Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 2013); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865,
876 (4th Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2012); Moore v.
Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 2012).
180 Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 91.
181 Id.
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that, based upon Heller, the “core” of the Second Amendment is the
ability to keep arms inside of the home, and that when a right does not
burden the “core,” a standard less than strict scrutiny should apply.182
The Court then concluded that intermediate scrutiny applied,183 and after
applying that standard upheld New York’s law.
Relying on Kachalsky, in Drake v. Filko, the Third Circuit also de-
clined to conduct a historical analysis as it relates to the extension of the
Second Amendment outside of the home, quoting Kachalsky that
“[h]istory and traditions do not speak with one voice here.”184 Without
conducting a historical analysis, the Third Circuit Court recognized that
“the Second Amendment’s individual right to bear arms may have some
application beyond the home.”185 In Drake, residents of New Jersey
challenged New Jersey’s permit law that required the showing of justifia-
ble need.186 The court agreed with the District Court that the right to
carry a handgun outside of the home was not part of the “core” of the
Second Amendment and therefore, intermediate scrutiny should apply.187
Applying intermediate scrutiny, the court found that New Jersey had an
“important interest in protecting its citizens’ safety,” and concluded New
Jersey’s law did not burden the Second Amendment.188
The Fourth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Wollard v. Gal-
lagher, upholding a Maryland law that required “good and substantial
reason” for having a permit to carry a firearm in public.189 The court in
Wollard acknowledged that the first question in resolving the issue is to
decide “whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling
within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee.”190 Neverthe-
less, with this understanding, the Fourth Circuit declined to find a defini-
tive ruling on whether the challenged law does burden the right claimed
by petitioners.191 The court then applied intermediate scrutiny when they
determined there was a “reasonable fit between the good-and-substantial-
reason requirement and Maryland’s objectives of protecting public safety
and preventing crime.”192
182 Id. at 93.
183 Id. at 96.
184 Drake, 724 F.3d 431 (quoting Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 91 (2d
Cir. 2012)).
185 Id.
186 Id. at 428.
187 Id. at 436.
188 Id. at 437, 440.
189 Wollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 882 (4th Cir. 2013).
190 Id. at 875.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 880
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2. Seventh Circuit Reaches the Proper Conclusion With the Wrong
Methodology
Separating itself from the other circuit courts, the Seventh Circuit
Court in Moore v. Madigan struck down two Illinois statutes as unconsti-
tutional.193 Petitioners challenged the Illinois laws that forbid a person
from carrying a ready-to-use gun and also forbid the unloaded gun from
being in public if ammunition was readily available.194 Relying on the
Supreme Court’s determination in Heller and McDonald, the court de-
clined to engage in “another round of historical analysis to determine
whether eighteenth-century America understood the Second Amendment
to include a right to bear guns outside the home.”195 The Seventh Circuit
Court noted that Illinois needed to provide more than a rational basis for
its law.196
While the opinion in Moore reached the proper conclusion, all of
these cases have one major flaw. None of them conducted the first step
inquiry to determine whether the carrying of a firearm in public is a fun-
damental right guaranteed by the Second Amendment. The Second,
Third, and Fourth Circuits flatly rejected to do so, in conflict, as the
Fourth Circuit Court noted, with the basic principle that the first step is to
determine whether the challenged law burdens conduct that falls within
the right. The Seventh Circuit Court relied upon Heller’s determination,
but Heller’s focus was on the language of the Second Amendment and
most notably, handguns in the home. Although the Seventh Circuit Court
was correct that Heller determined the Second Amendment conferred a
right to bear arms for self-defense, the court should have conducted a
historical analysis to determine if the right claimed was a fundamental
right.
3. Peruta En Banc Panel’s Historical Analysis was Flawed by The
Narrow Framing of the Issue
By narrowly framing the issue in Peruta as to whether the right to
carry a concealed weapon outside of the home is protected by the Second
Amendment, the majority proceeded by following a flawed historical
analysis. In conducting its historical analysis, the en banc majority in
Peruta first began with a view back into English prohibition on carrying
concealed weapons. Going as far back as 1299, the majority found that
193 Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012).
194 Moore, 702 F.3d at 934.
195 Id. at 942.
196 Id.
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there was a general prohibition on carrying a weapon without a license
from the king.197 This policy of prohibiting concealed weapons included
Queen Elizabeth I’s proclamation in 1594 that no person should have a
concealed weapon on their person.198 The flawed approach is even more
apparent when the court turns towards case precedent in the United
States; it is then that their historical analysis begins to fall apart.
The first case cited by the en banc panel is State v. Mitchell, in
which the court in a single sentence wrote “[i]t was held in this case, that
the statute of 1831, prohibiting all persons, except travelers, from wear-
ing or carrying concealed weapons, is not unconstitutional.”199 However
the en banc panels reliance on this is misguided as this cannot be said to
be a total prohibition since the Indiana Supreme Court clearly articulated
when it allowed for travelers to carry concealed weapons on their per-
sons. In the second case cited by the en banc majority, State v. Reid, the
Alabama Supreme Court upheld a conviction for carrying of a concealed
weapon.200 In Reid, the Alabama Supreme Court based its decision in
part on the English Bill of Rights and the practical grounds for regulation
of concealed weapons.201 However, this case failed to conduct a proper
historical analysis for two reasons. The first reason was that, in its deci-
sion, the Alabama Supreme Court took as prima facie evidence of the
law’s constitutionality that the General Assembly and the Governor of
Alabama sworn oath to uphold the constitution is evidence that the legis-
lature has not overstepped.202 However, courts regularly strike down
laws passed by those who are sworn to uphold the Constitution. The
second issue was the practice of concealed carry, where open carry was
legal.203 This was the issue that Judge Callahan warned about in the ma-
jority’s narrow phrasing of the issue. While a prohibition in Reid against
concealed carry was found to be constitutional, the court never addresses
the right outside of the home because the right to open carry was already
protected.
The Georgia Supreme Court similarly upheld a statute that criminal-
ized concealed carry.204 However, this case had the same flaws as Reid
197 Peruta, 824 F.3d at 929.
198 Id. at 931.
199 State v. Mitchell, 3 Blackf. 229 (Ind. 1833).
200 State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612 (1840); Peruta, 824 F.3d at 933-34.
201 Reid, 1 Ala.at 615 (reasoning that an English statute preventing the carrying of weapons
concealed could guide the court in their interpretation of the constitution.).
202 Reid, 1 Ala. at 620-21 (“It has received the assent of the two houses of the General As.
Sembly [sic] and the Governor, under a solemn pledge to support the constitution; and their opinion
is at least, prima facie evidence, that they have not overstepped the limits of legislative
competency.”).
203 Reid, 1 Ala. at 621.
204 Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846).
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because while the court upheld a concealed carry ban, it did so because
Georgia allowed for open carry.205
The majority’s historical analysis continues with conflict after con-
flict with the narrowing of their question and Heller. The majority’s
cases cited for precedent in their decision include: Aymette v. State, a
case that held that “bear arms” was meant for military use;206 State v.
Buzzard, a case in which the court rejected the Second Amendment as an
individual right, holding its purpose was for the regulation of a militia;207
State v. Chandler, upholding a concealed carry ban but also found that
the right to open carry is “guaranteed by the Constitution of the United
States. . .;”208 and State v. Workman, a case in which the term “arms”
from the Second Amendment was defined as those weapons to be used
by the militia.209
Lastly, the en banc majority finished its historical analysis by citing
Walburn v. Territory and Robertson v. Baldwin as authorities supporting
the prohibition on concealed carry.210 However, the court should not
have followed the holdings in these authorities for two reasons.  First,
they do not distinguish whether the law prohibited or allowed for open
carry. Second, they do not indicate if the Second Amendment was in
accordance with Heller’s holding defining the Second Amendment as an
individual right.
4. A Proper Historical Analysis Would Have Led to a Similar
Conclusion as the Peruta three-panel
Since the circuit courts failed to conduct a historical analysis, they
proceeded on the assumption that the right to bear arms in public is not a
fundamental right and therefore they failed to apply the appropriate stan-
dard. Each of these courts should have applied strict scrutiny because, as
the Peruta three-panel historical analysis shows, the Second Amendment
does protect the right to bear arms in public.
As stated, the Supreme Court in Heller adopted the definition for the
Second Amendment “wear, bear, or carry . . . upon the person or in the
clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose . . . of being armed and ready for
offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict with another per-
205 Nunn, 1 Ga. at 251. (“But that so much of it, as contains a prohibition against bearing
arms openly, is in conflict with the Constitution, and void.).
206 Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 934 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc); Aymette v.
State, 21 Tenn. 154, 161 (1840).
207 State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 24 (1840).
208 State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 490 (La. 1850).
209 State v. Workman, 35 W. Va. 367, 14 S.E. 9, 11 (W. Va. 1891).
210 Peruta, 824 F.3d at 938.
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son.”211 As the Court in Moore remarked, “confrontations are not limited
to the home.”212  “To speak of ‘bearing’ arms within one’s home would
at all times have been an awkward usage. A right to bear arms thus im-
plies a right to carry a loaded gun outside the home.”213
To say that the Second Amendment does not protect the right to
carry outside of the home, or that it is not at its core, would create an
awkward usage of the definition adopted by the Supreme Court in Hel-
ler.214 When you think of carrying a gun on your person or in your
pocket, the logical image conjured up is not an image of a person tending
to their garden with a semi-automatic. Nor are images conjured of “a
father stuffing a six-shooter in his pajama’s pocket before heading down-
stairs to start the morning coffee.”215 Such images are nonsensical. The
analysis by the Peruta Court, combined with the definition from Heller,
show the Second Amendment applies to carrying firearms in public. As
such, the right to carry in public is protected by the Constitution and, at a
minimum, requires the protection of strict scrutiny.
Further, the conclusion by the courts that the right to bear arms in
the home is the core of the Second Amendment plainly ignores the lan-
guage of McDonald that “individual self-defense is ‘the central compo-
nent’ of the Second Amendment.”216 Relying on the statement that the
Second Amendment is at its core in the home, conflicts directly with this
language. If the central component of the Second Amendment is self-
defense, this implies that the “core” of the Second Amendment must be
self-defense. Therefore, the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits all pro-
ceeded on the wrong assumption that the “core” of the Second Amend-
ment is only in the home. The Ninth Circuit en banc panel chose to
proceed by narrowing the question to only concealed carry and not
whether the right to carry in some form is protected outside of the
home.217 A proper historical analysis and a properly framed question,
whether the Second Amendment extends outside of the home, would
211 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 584 (2008) (agreeing with Justice Gins-
berg’s analysis on the natural meaning of “bear arms” in her dissenting opinion in Muscarello v.
United States, 524 U.S. 125, 143 (1998)).
212 Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 2012).
213 Moore, 702 F.3d at 936.
214 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 584 (adopting “wear, bear, or carry . . . upon the person or in the
clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose. . .of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action
in a case of conflict with another person.”).
215 Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1152 (2014) rev’d en banc, 824 F.3d 919
(9th Cir. 2016).
216 McDonald v. City of Chicago., 561 U.S. 742, 744 (2010).
217 Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 946 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Callahan, M.,
dissenting) (“the majority sets up and knocks down an elaborate straw argument by answering only a
narrow question —whether the Second Amendment protects a right to carry concealed firearms in
public”).
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have allowed these courts to reach a conclusion like Peruta’s three-panel
as shown above.218
B. COURTS SHOULD APPLY STRICT SCRUTINY TO SECOND
AMENDMENT CHALLENGES
Strict scrutiny is a heightened level of judicial review applicable to
challenged laws or policies that are deemed to conflict with a fundamen-
tal right. To pass strict scrutiny, the government must be able to prove:
(1) there is a compelling government interest behind the law; and (2) the
law is narrowly tailored to achieve the result.219 This is a greater standard
than the intermediate scrutiny approach applied by the Second, Third,
and Fourth Circuit Courts. In applying the lesser standard, these courts
have conducted a judicial balancing that was rejected by the majority in
Heller. Similarly, proponents of intermediate scrutiny point to language
in Heller that upheld restrictions on firearms, such as convicted felons,
as reasoning that such restrictions could not be upheld under strict scru-
tiny. However, these restrictions can still be upheld under strict scrutiny.
Lastly, the application of intermediate scrutiny ignores the similarities
between the First and Second Amendment, with the First Amendment
having the application of strict scrutiny.
1. Intermediate Scrutiny Would Allow For Judicial Balancing that
was Expressly Rejected in Heller
Intermediate scrutiny requires that the government’s asserted interest
must be more than just legitimate.220 To pass intermediate scrutiny “the
law must further a government interest by means that are substantially
related to that interest.”221 This requires that the government show that
there is a “significant, substantial, or important” need for the challenged
law.222 In determining this, the court then must weigh that challenged
law with the government interest against the right claimed by the peti-
tioner. This is exactly the kind of judicial balancing test rejected by the
majority in Heller.
218 See supra Background, section 4A.
219 Brett Snider, Challenging Laws: 3 Levels of Scrutiny Explained, FINDLAW, (Jan. 27, 2014,
9;05 AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/law_and_life/2014/01/challenging-laws-3-levels-of-scrutiny-
explained.html.
220 Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 436 (3d Cir. 2013).
221 Legal Institute Information, Intermediate Scrutiny, CORNEL UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/intermediate_scrutiny (last visited Oct. 22, 2016).
222 Drake, 724 F.3d at 436.
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We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core pro-
tection has been subjected to a freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ ap-
proach. The very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of
government—even the Third Branch of Government—the power to
decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insist-
ing upon. A constitutional guarantee subject to future judges’ assess-
ments of its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all.
Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were under-
stood to have when the people adopted them, whether or not future
legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that scope too broad.223
The majority’s rejection of the “interest-balancing” approach for an
enumerated constitutional right is on its face a rejection of intermediate
scrutiny. The conclusion that this is a rejection of intermediate scrutiny is
further supported by Justice Thomas’ dissenting opinion denying certio-
rari in Jackson v. City and County of San Francisco.224 In Jackson, the
San Francisco Police Code prevented a person from possessing a hand-
gun in the home unless it was locked in a container or disabled by a
trigger lock.225 Residents filed suit against the city, claiming the city’s
requirements infringed on the decision rendered in Heller.226 The district
court denied petitioners and the Ninth Circuit Court affirmed.227 Justice
Thomas took issue with the fact that the Ninth Circuit Court acknowl-
edged the law burdened the Second Amendment but reasoned it was not
a severe burden and applied intermediate scrutiny.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is in serious tension with Heller.
We explained in Heller that the Second Amendment codified a right
“inherited from our English ancestors,’ a key component of which is
the right to keep and bear arms for the lawful purpose of self-de-
fense . . . . The [San Francisco] law burdens their right to self-defense
at the times they are most vulnerable — when they are sleeping, bath-
ing, changing clothes, or otherwise indisposed. There is consequently
no question that San Francisco’s law burdens the core of the Second
Amendment right . . . . When a law burdens a constitutionally pro-
tected right, we have generally required a higher showing than the
Court of Appeals demanded here . . . . The [Supreme] Court should
have granted a writ of certiorari to review this questionable decision
and to reiterate that courts may not engage in this sort of judicial as-
223 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634-35 (2008).
224 Jackson v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 135 S.Ct. 2799 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
225 Id.
226 Id. at 2800.
227 Id.
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sessment as the severity of a burden imposed on core Second Amend-
ment rights.228
Justice Thomas’ remarks regarding San Francisco’s law show the
exact type of judicial balancing that the Supreme Court sought to reject
when it decided Heller. There is no doubt the Second Amendment, since
the decision in Heller, has become a hotly contested issue, evident by the
many challenges to state’s gun laws since the decision in 2008. The ma-
jority in Heller sought to ensure that decisions by judges or legislatures
which encroach on a constitutional right are to be limited to strict scru-
tiny, where the government is required to show a compelling interest on
burdening the Second Amendment. Anything less than strict scrutiny
would require the very sort of judicial balancing under intermediate scru-
tiny rejected in Heller.
2. Prohibitions Against Felons and the Mentally-Ill Can Still Be
Upheld Under Strict Scrutiny
Opponents of strict scrutiny have argued that if courts were to apply
strict scrutiny to Second Amendment challenges then some of the restric-
tions the Supreme Court said were appropriate in Heller would be found
invalid. Specifically, opponents of strict scrutiny in this context point to
the language in Heller that reads “nothing in our opinion should be taken
to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms
by felons and the mentally ill. . .”229 A recent case out of Missouri allows
opponents of strict scrutiny to rest easy, as the Missouri Supreme Court
demonstrated common sense gun control laws can be upheld, even under
strict scrutiny.
In State v. Merritt, the Missouri Supreme Court applied strict scru-
tiny to a law that prevented felons from possession of firearms and up-
held the law.230 According to Missouri’s Constitution, the right to bear
arms provision, state courts must apply “strict scrutiny” to “law restrict-
ing the right to bear arms.”231 Under Missouri’s law, it is a crime for a
person who has been convicted of a felony to possess a firearm.232 Mer-
ritt was charged with possession of a firearm and challenged the law,
arguing that it violated his right to bear arms under the Missouri Consti-
tution.233 Missouri’s Constitution reads in part “the right of every citizen
228 Id. at 2800-02.
229 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
230 State v. Merritt, 467 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Mo. 2015).
231 Id. at 810.
232 See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.070.1(1) (2010).
233 Merritt, 467 S.W.3d at 810.
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to keep and bear arms, ammunition, and accessories typical to the normal
function of such arms, in defense of his home, person, family and prop-
erty, or when lawfully summoned in aid of the civil power, shall not be
questioned.”234
In addressing the Missouri statute under strict scrutiny, the Missouri
Supreme Court found the law would survive. The Missouri Supreme
Court reasoned that Missouri has a compelling interest in ensuring public
safety and reducing crime. By prohibiting felons from possessing fire-
arms, where it is well established that felons are more likely to commit
violent crimes, prohibiting possession is narrowly tailored to achieve
Missouri’s interest in public safety.235  “Furthermore, ‘someone with a
felony conviction on his record is more likely than a non-felon to engage
in illegal and violent gun use.’”236
Merritt is a prime example of how challenges to laws that burden
the Second Amendment can still survive under strict scrutiny. Although
Merritt challenged Missouri’s Constitution, the Missouri clause is similar
in language to that of the Second Amendment. Merritt also shows that it
is not impossible for a state law to be upheld under strict scrutiny. A
popular belief of strict scrutiny is that it is “fatal in fact,” however, this
has been shown to be over-exaggerated and that in nearly thirty percent
of cases involving strict scrutiny, the challenged law is upheld.237 A state
can show that felons or the mentally-ill should not be able to possess
handguns, as Missouri did.
By applying strict scrutiny, states can limit firearm possession while
not burdening the rights of law-abiding citizens. Unlike where the state
can show a compelling interest for felons or mentally-ill, it would be
difficult for the state to show a compelling interest for burdening the
rights of law-abiding citizens. The application of strict scrutiny, as shown
by Missouri, still allows for laws to be upheld that Heller did not wish to
cast doubt on. If such laws can still be upheld under strict scrutiny, then
there is no reason to apply the lesser standard of intermediate scrutiny,
and engage in the interest balancing that Heller prohibited.
234 Mo. Const. art. I, § 23.
235 Merritt, 467 S.W.3d at 814.
236 Id. (quoting United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 685 (7th Cir. 2010)).
237 Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scru-
tiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 796 (2006).
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3. The Supreme Court has Compared the Second Amendment to the
First Amendment
In relation to other constitutional amendments in the Bill of Rights,
strict scrutiny is applied to both the First and Fifth Amendments.238
Many of the Bill of Rights however, do not apply strict scrutiny in chal-
lenges including the Fourth, Sixth, and some provisions of the Eighth
Amendments.239 Still, the Supreme Court has regularly compared the
Second Amendment to the First Amendment. Strict scrutiny is applied in
those cases involving the First Amendment.240 It is generally only appli-
cable to First Amendment cases that are considered content-specific.241
This Note will not conduct an analysis of whether obtaining a CCW
could be analogous to content-specific speech.
In Heller, the Supreme Court noted during its historical analysis that
the phrase “right of the people” is found in only two other constitutional
amendments, the First and the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court
also used the First Amendment to address the argument that only the
arms available at the time the Second Amendment was adopted should
be protected. The Court rejected that argument noting that the First
Amendment protects modern forms of communication.242 Lastly, the
Court noted that “the First Amendment contains the freedom-of-speech
guarantee that the people ratified, which included exceptions for obscen-
ity, libel, and disclosure of state secrets, but not for the expression of
extremely unpopular and wrongheaded views. The Second Amendment
is no different.”243
In McDonald, when discussing the incorporation of the Bill of
Rights through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Supreme Court offered the First Amendment as an example of how
the Supreme Court has incorporated other rights. Specifically, the Court
noted that originally the right to peacefully assemble under the First
Amendment was found to apply only to the federal government.244 How-
ever, the Supreme Court later incorporated the right to assemble through
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. “We follow the same
path here. . . . ”245
238 Adam Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamental Rights, 23 CONST. COMMENT.
227, 233 (2006).
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Id. at 237.
242 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008).
243 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
244 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 759 (2010); see U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
542 (1875).
245 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 759.
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Guided by the Supreme Court, Peruta made a similar analogy using
free speech. The Court reasoned that San Diego County’s policy towards
concealed carry was as if San Diego County had banned all political
speech, but allowed an exemption for certain people, places, and situa-
tions. “Although these exceptions might preserve small pockets of free-
dom, they would do little to prevent destruction of the right to free
speech as a whole.”246 These comparisons show that strict scrutiny ap-
plies to the Second Amendment.
C. USING STRICT SCRUTINY, SAN DIEGO COUNTY’S REGULATORY
SCHEME FAILS TO MEET A COMPELLING INTEREST
As stated, for a law that burdens a fundamental right to survive strict
scrutiny, the government must show that there is a compelling interest
behind the law and that the law is narrowly tailored to achieve the result.
The County of San Diego would be unable to argue effectively that there
is a compelling interest in its justification that self-defense does not meet
good cause. In amicus briefs filed by law enforcement, as well as statisti-
cal data, the research showed that concealed carry holders are less likely
to commit crime that other citizens.  Thus, San Diego cannot show a
compelling interest for public safety or that the “good cause” require-
ment is narrowly tailored to achieve that goal.247
An amicus brief filed by the Western States Sheriffs’ Association,
signed on by eleven California sheriffs, asserted that San Diego County’s
“good cause” requirement is out of touch with the rest of California
where “many of California’s fifty-eight sheriffs, including Amici, recog-
nize self-defense as ‘good cause’ under the CCW licensing statute.”248
The Western State Sheriffs’ Association stated its belief that the Second
Amendment secures a right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-
defense and because of this fundamental right, “the scheme adopted by
San Diego is not narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government
interest . . . instead, the overly subjective San Diego licensing scheme
unlawfully prevents law-abiding citizens from exercising their rights to
bear arms under the Second Amendment.”249
Similarly in an amicus brief filed by the International Law Enforce-
ment Educators and Trainers Association, along with the Law Enforce-
ment Legal Defense Fund, Law Enforcement Action Network, and Law
246 Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1170 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 824
F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016).
247 Brief for Western States Sheriffs’ Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appel-
lants at 6, Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014).
248 Id. at 11.
249 Id. at 6.
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Enforcement Alliance of America, the authors noted that a government
argument in favor of law enforcement would be at odds with a 2013 poll
conducted by PoliceOne which received over 15,000 law enforcement
officers input  strongly supporting licensed carry.250 In addition, studies
have shown that “people who carry licenses are much more law-abiding
than the general population.”251
The International Law Enforcement Educators Amici distinguished
their view from San Diego County’s declaration from Franklin Zimring,
in which Zimring declared that “concealed handguns are the priority of
law enforcement everywhere because of the use of concealed handgun in
vast numbers of criminal offenses.”252 This finding by Zimring is at odds
with the poll of law enforcement officers and with the data. As counsel
for Peruta, former Solicitor General Paul Clement pointed out during oral
arguments in the en banc Ninth Circuit Court argument that Zimring’s
declaration never answers the real question that would be required by
San Diego County. Per Clement, Zimring makes two observations: (1)
fewer guns equals less violence, and; (2) fewer concealed guns, less vio-
lence.253 The real question that needed to be addressed is “if there are
less concealed licensed guns how does that affect the level of violence?
That’s the relevant question and the county has no evidence on that.”254
In fact, San Diego County would have a difficult time in obtaining such
evidence because the evidence does not exist, or San Diego would have
presented such evidence to the court.
In the amicus briefs filed on behalf of San Diego County, many
appear to start their arguments with the presumption that more guns
equal more crime. However, they base their conclusions on speculation
and assumptions. For instance, in an amicus brief filed by the State of
Hawaii, they argue that having a weapon could increase the number of
conflicts and that the carrying of a firearm could increase the likelihood
of starting many fights.255 Their briefs further goes on to claim that pos-
session of a firearm by non-law enforcement members means daily the
250 Id. at 3.
251 Id. at 25
252 Id. at 5.
253 See United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 10-56791 Edward Peruta v.
County of San Diego, at 13:30, YOUTUBE, (June 16, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=anKf
Vru1des.
254 See United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 10-56791 Edward Peruta v.
County of San Diego, at 13:45, YOUTUBE, (June 16, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=anKf
Vru1des.
255 Brief for State of Hawaii as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellees at 7, Peruta v.
County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added).
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public safety is more jeopardized than enhanced.256 However, these
claims are quickly debunked by amicus briefs filed in support of Peruta.
The brief filed by the Governors of Texas, Louisiana, Maine, Missis-
sippi, Oklahoma, and South Dakota, details the last ten years of data on
concealed handgun licenses (“CHL”), the Texas equivalent of a CCW,
and the results do not favor Hawaii’s argument. For instance, the data
showed that CHL holders were ten times less likely to commit a crime,
eleven times less likely to commit an aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon, and seven times less likely to commit deadly conduct with a
firearm.257 The amicus noted that while there have been at least five
studies that show right-to-carry laws reduce violent crime, many critics
nitpick the research to say that the CHL laws have no effect on crime
rates but are unable to offer any evidence to show that right-to-carry laws
increase crime.258
As noted by Clement, one of the biggest flaws in San Diego
County’s argument is the lack of evidence to support such a rule.259
The answer is sitting in plain sight. In Sacramento County, in Fresno
County, in San Bernardino County, there is no evidence in this record
. . . that when those [counties] adopted a more permissive interpreta-
tion of the good cause standard that the sky fell, or that violence went
up, or that crime went up.260
Clement further commented that it would be difficult for California
to claim a public safety interest because if Peruta had lived in a county
like Sacramento where self-defense is accepted as “good cause,” then
California would not have an interest in this case.261
Since California would be unable to put forth a public safety claim
and San Diego County’s policy is out of line with the rest of California,
San Diego County’s policy would not be upheld under strict scrutiny. As
the Peruta three-panel court noted, Judge Hardiman’s dissent in Drake
can almost perfectly summarize San Diego’s “good cause” requirement.
Judge Hardiman wrote “the regulation at issue is a rationing system. It
aims . . . simply to reduce the total number of firearms carried outside of
the home by limiting the privilege to those who can demonstrate ‘good
256 Id. at 9.
257 Brief for the Governors of Texas et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants at
11-13, Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014).
258 Id.
259 See United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 10-56791 Edward Peruta v.
County of San Diego, at 14:40-15:10, YOUTUBE, (June 16, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=anKfVru1des.
260 Id.
261 Id.
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reason’ beyond a general desire for self-defense.”262 Put plainly, a ration-
ing system is not a compelling interest to limit a fundamental right and as
such, San Diego’s policy interpretation of “good cause” would not
survive.
III. CONCLUSION
When our founders decided to form the Bill of Rights, they did not
simply place all the choices at random in a hat, pulling them out one by
one and giving them a number. The right to keep and bear arms directly
follows the amendment that grants us the most freedom, the First
Amendment. If viewed in a hierarchy of their specific enumeration, the
founders specifically placed the right to bear arms directly following the
right granting freedom to the people to speak their mind and to practice
their religion. The right to bear arms was so important that it was placed
above unreasonable government intrusion.
Courts will continue to struggle with challenges to the Second
Amendment until the Supreme Court affirmatively indicates what type of
scrutiny should be applied. Based upon the language of Heller, McDon-
ald, and Justice Thomas’ dissent in Jackson, the level of scrutiny should
be strict scrutiny. By applying strict scrutiny to an enumerated constitu-
tional right that is comparable to the First Amendment, which in many
cases receives a strict scrutiny application, the right to keep and bear
arms for self-defense can be protected and still allow for sound govern-
ment policies, such as those that prevent mentally-ill or felons from pos-
sessing weapons.
Peruta is the perfect vehicle for the Supreme Court to grant certio-
rari and provide much needed guidance. With the ruling of the Ninth
Circuit Court, there are now five circuit courts that have weighed in on
the Second Amendment right as it applies beyond the home. The Seventh
Circuit Court struck down those laws that burden the right while the Sec-
ond, Third, and Fourth Circuit Courts have upheld those laws under an
application of intermediate scrutiny. The Ninth Circuit three-panel, after
its historical analysis, decided that the Second Amendment extended
outside of the home and policies like the County of San Diego are uncon-
stitutional. By conducting a misguided historical analysis, the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court en banc went in the opposite direction, finding that there is no
right outside of the home, in conflict with all other reviewing courts. Gun
control and gun laws will continue to be debated throughout the country.
262 Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1178 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 824
F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Woollard v. Sheridan, 863 F. Supp. 2d 462, 474 (D. Md. 2012),
rev’d sub nom. Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013).
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However, just as with the cases involved with gay marriage,263 there
comes a time where the Supreme Court must weigh in on the debate and
perform the “duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”264
Peruta can guide the Supreme Court in its analysis as the three-
judge panel is the only one to conduct a historical application, the same
as in Heller and McDonald, and unlike the other circuit courts. Peruta
also gives the Supreme Court the ability to weigh in on whether a state
must allow some form of firearm possession outside of the home. Under
Peruta, Californians now have no recourse outside of the home should a
county choose to refuse to issue concealed carry permits. Until such a
time that the Supreme Court decides how to handle challenges to the
Second Amendment, private citizens are left in the dark about what
Peruta’s three-judge panel shows is a fundamental right.
Our society is changing. While some continue to argue that more
gun laws and regulations will increase overall gun crime, there is no
evidence that shows licensed holders will cause an increase. As noted by
Clement, San Diego County could not justify a public safety claim be-
cause it does not exist. Requiring San Diego County to issue CCWs, in
accordance with the majority of counties in California, will not lead to a
massive increase in crime. Based upon the data provided to the court, the
opposite will occur.  Some of the largest counties in California, including
the state capital located in Sacramento County, provide CCWs for self-
defense. In these counties, there is no proof that crime rose or that li-
censed holders began murdering people in the street. What is evident
though, just as those brave individuals in Chicago and Philadelphia
show, is that when licensed citizens are armed, they have the potential to
prevent violent mass shootings and save lives.
There has never been a time when the right to self-defense is more
needed in public. Law-abiding citizens are increasingly becoming targets
of those bent on causing harm. More than ever, we need a standard that
will stop courts from deciding on a case-by-case basis whether the right
to self-defenses is “worth insisting upon.”265 Through the application of
strict scrutiny, citizens will know their constitutional Second Amend-
ment right is protected, free from those who disagree, because “a consti-
tutional guarantee subject to future judges’ assessments of its usefulness
is no constitutional guarantee at all.”266
263 See Obergefell v. Hodges 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
264 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
265 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634-35 (2008).
266 Heller, 554 U.S. at 634-35.
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